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DD/S 63-0327

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25 JAN 1963

OFM2

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Interim Observations on Mail and Courier Study

1. Although final conclusions will be drawn by you and the Task Force, I am setting forth in this memorandum some observations based on the data and interviews available to date. I hope they will be of value to you, the Task Force, and

2. SPECIAL RUNS

a. An analysis made with the help of the Mail and Courier Branch reveals that in a test week ending 15 January 1963, there were twenty special runs made outside from the Headquarters building and the R&S building, when regular service was available within the next one to two hours. Five of those were from the Office of National Estimates and undoubtedly were urgent intelligence estimates. The urgency of the material to the Army Map Service (with which we have a relay point) and from the Biographic Register to the State Department is not known to me; and, of course, cannot be questioned by the courier dispatchers. The publication of the available regular runs should help in reducing requests for special service.


b. During the same week there were only two special runs made between rooms in the new building, excluding to and from GB-31, the courier mail room. Runs to and from GB-31 are primarily for picking up material to be delivered by special courier outside the building and delivering material which is brought in by shuttle and requiring expeditious handling. The Mail and Courier Branch has suggested to a number of callers for service from/to GB-31 that the pneumatic tube system be used, and they have met with some success.

3. DUPLICATION OF RUNS

a. Internal - A charting of stops made of the internal courier systems of the Headquarters building reveal some overlaps in areas of service and duplication of service to particular rooms. The extent of justification for these situations was not explored except that a Cable Secretariat representative stated that they attempted to

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use the RID system when they first moved into the building, but found that it didn't work -- primarily because of delays, necessity for wrapping, and TOP SECRET clearance. It is quite obvious from the chart that if some of the offices did not have their own systems it would take additional manpower for the Mail and Courier Branch to furnish the same service.

b. External - The duplication of service between the Mail and Courier Branch and some of the other external systems is more apparent than real. I went into the possibilities for consolidating runs between the Mail and Courier Branch and the Office of Current Intelligence in some depth. The representatives of both systems and myself explored the areas of apparent duplication and found that such elements as time, "babysitting," and need for two couriers plus firearms for special material preclude the Mail and Courier Branch from combining the CCI runs with those of the Mail and Courier Branch.

c. The Office of Personnel has agreed to give up its run to 1016-16th Street. Other possibilities for consolidating runs are those of the Office of Special Activities and the Central Processing Branch in purchasing airline tickets, and servicing the post office boxes of the Insurance Branch by the Mail and Courier Branch. Both OSA and the Insurance Branch have agreed to being relieved of these runs, providing equal service can be offered and security maintained. One of the possibilities for reducing the escort service for the Insurance Branch might be that of providing it with a car to be driven by its own qualified driver or having the Insurance Branch's representative accompany the driver on regular runs.

d. The Library has agreed to give up its runs to the Library of Congress and [redacted] This will save a couple of hours a day in OCB with no additional burden on the Mail and Courier Branch. (The Chief of the Branch will contact TSD and suggest handling TSD runs that appear duplicative.)

4. EFFICIENCY OF REGULAR SERVICE

a. In cooperation with [redacted] eight tests were made from the ONE Registry (from which the C-DD/I dispatches its outgoing mail) to all major internal and external components of the DD/I. The tests showed that any appreciable delay between sender and recipient is not the result of slow courier service. Tests were made at three different times during the day--the first courier service in the morning, the one just before noon, and the last pick-up in the afternoon, necessitating in most of the latter

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cases holding the mail in the Mail and Courier Branch over night.

b. Attachment (A) reveals that mail sent at 0910 was received by components in the building between 0937 and 1020, and at other buildings between 1230 and 1600 on the same day. (Although the Acquisitions Branch Registry received the mail at 1600, it was apparently delivered to a receiving room in [] at 1245.) All mail sent out at 1150 was delivered in the building by 1400 and to other buildings by 1600 the same day, *and most of it an hour earlier. The mail to other buildings was delivered between 0948 and 1035. *Insert: Mail sent at 1600 was all delivered in the building by 0952 the following day,

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c. The study of mail moving between the north and south portions of the building has been completed and details are being typed. Some of the interesting facts developed are as follows:

(1) The average time from DD/I components to RID mail room is 75 minutes, from there to the DD/P components -- 53 minutes, for a total of 2 hours and 8 minutes.

(2) The average time from DD/P components to DD/I is 3 hours and 58 minutes when sent "free," and five hours and 35 minutes when logged in RID. In addition to the possibility of saving personnel, there is a strong possibility of saving time by eliminating logging in RID, particularly where area divisions are already logging out the material before sending it to RID. (See Tab B. DD/P Logging Procedures) There was one case where the working hours of elapsed time was 6 hours and 50 minutes for "free mail," and logged mail in one instance took 9 hours and 37 minutes. An analysis of 16 courier receipts for mail going south to north shows the average time of delivery from receipt by M&C Branch to registry in north portion to be 63 minutes. (See Tab C) I believe every effort should be made to integrate the RID and Mail and Courier Branch systems to save time. One of the best ways would be to send from a conveyor room in one part of the building directly to one in the other part of the building. Although I have an agreement from representatives of the two systems to explore the possibilities, the DD/P representative has doubts whether the CI Staff will permit it.

5. OUTGOING U. S. MAIL

a. Mail to be sent through the U. S. mails is forwarded to the Mail and Courier Branch mailroom with a courier receipt and postage

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slip (Form 239). If the slip becomes detached, classified mail may not go by registered mail, etc., as required. Suggestions have been made that identifying marks be printed on envelopes, but the Office of Security quite wisely opposed this. I suggest that a code of letters be written in pencil in the upper right-hand corner where they will be covered by the stamp or other postage. Such a code as this might be used:

- (1) f - first class
- (2) fs - first class, special delivery
- (3) fr - first class, registered
- (4) frr - first class, special registered
- (5) frr - first class, registered (return receipt requested)
- (6) a - air mail (a -- additional symbols as appropriate)
- (7) p - parcel post

6. MAIL CONTROL FINDINGS

a. A consolidation of the reports from three largest areas, DD/L, DD/P, and DD/S (most of whose components have reported), reveals the variety of practices current in the Agency. Some of the interesting information reported is as follows:

(1) Of 241 components reporting that they log, 32 are at the first management echelon below a Deputy Director (Office, Senior Staff, Area Division, etc.), 119 at the second echelon e.g., DD/P branches, [] in the Office of Security, Economic Research Area, ORR, Supply Division, CI, etc.), 73 at the third echelon, and 14 at the fourth echelon. (Although in some cases mail may go through all the echelons up to a Deputy Director, much of the mail goes directly to a lower echelon such as an area division branch and is logged there.) Even if another facility or registry could satisfy the security logging requirements and furnish information as to the location of the component's mail, 161 report they could not give up logging. The reasons vary, but involve special types of material, sensitivity, checks, and particularly the doubt that the information could be made available as quickly and accurately as needed to carry on their operations efficiently. Some of the area divisions feel quite strongly about continuation of logging at the branch level and indicated if any change is contemplated they would like to present a rebuttal. Many of the 73 who thought they might give it up also expressed qualifications in their answers and suggested they would have to log certain material for management or special security purposes. Although there are many different interpretations of the obscure security requirements, the security factor seems to

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be subordinate to the administrative control factors.

(2) Some 259 components have other mail activities such as delivery service, determination of routing, etc. The purpose of these mail activities was given as follows:

- 145 - to meet security logging requirements
- 194 - to determine action component or individual
- 189 - to determine component or individual requiring the information
- 185 - to know location at all times of mail
- 131 - to effect management control through suspense dates, follow-up, etc.
- 34 - miscellaneous other reasons

(3) Although document receipts (Form 615) are not required by regulation within the Agency, 21 report obtaining them and 264 do not. (See Tabs D & E)

(4) Regulations do not require the use of courier receipts inside or outside the Agency for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents although they may be used and are encouraged by the Mail and Courier Branch. However, document receipts are required for SECRET documents outside the Agency. Some components report using the courier receipt as a log (for which it was designed) but many do not use it. The use is reported as follows:

	<u>Use</u>	<u>Do Not Use</u>
Outside the Agency	104	165
Outside the building within the Agency	82	187
Inside the building	29	221

b. Some of the reasons for using courier and document receipts indicate different understandings of the Regulations. Some people indicate that there is better handling of material with courier receipts. Our North-South study shows that material sent with a courier receipt does not arrive any faster or more securely in the building than without a receipt. Several people recommended a clear manual of requirements which could be used for training and reference.

c. If the use of document and courier receipts is to be continued, particularly to cover the same document, then a form devised for use in DD/P should be considered for Agency-wide use. This form combines the two and cuts down on the typing and number of forms. The fact that 111 components report using courier receipts inside the Agency against 21

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using document receipts indicates that senders are more interested in proving that they don't have the document any longer than being assured that the ultimate user of the document received it.

d. Although comments on service were not requested, many components were complimentary of the courier service. Suggestions for improvements have been passed on to the chief of the appropriate service. I have met with the representatives of RID and the Mail and Courier Branch to point up the problem of service from the south to north portion of the building.

e. There was apparently some misunderstanding as to questions concerning the number of times mail is received versus the number of times it is distributed internally. However, enough clear answers were received to indicate that in some components the mail is not distributed as frequently as received, and a reduction in deliveries by the Mail and Courier Branch would have little adverse effect. Others indicated they would like earlier and/or later pick-ups and deliveries.

7. The problem of speeding up the movement of mail goes well beyond the transporting and routine control aspects. In fact, the use of suspense dates and follow-up takes a relatively small amount of time and may mean expediting the answering and movement of mail by days. It is my personal opinion that emphasis should be put on reducing the layers of review, concurrence, and rewriting, or at least the time taken for these actions, which would also eliminate in some cases the relatively lesser time taken in logging, etc. Extra copies to reduce consecutive routing was also a suggestion made to reduce delay. Although there is room for improvement in the Agency-wide systems and procedures, internal procedures should be given close scrutiny by individual components before so readily drawing the conclusion that the courier systems are causing the delay.

8. According to the reports furnished by the components there are over 50 different types of forms, cards, or books used in logging mail. Standardization might mean some savings in printing, although many components use plain paper and cards or ditto at no printing cost.

In some cases a specially designed form for peculiar requirements may save time which was the factor used by the Records Administration Officer in calculating possible savings. (See Tab F) Reducing the number of forms will not accomplish the savings in time. Time will be saved only when the need

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for mail control is eliminated, and this need from the standpoint of a component generally goes beyond the security requirements, particularly in controlling incoming mail.

/s/


Office of the Deputy Director (Support)

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DRAFT:MW:js(24 Jan 63)

MRW;fmf (25 Jan 63)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Adse w/Tabs A thru F

1 - DD/S Chrono

1 - DD/S Subject (With Tabs attached to Orig 7 & 1)

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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17 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DD/P Logging Procedures

1. [] of RID told me today that a [] Notice had been prepared and forwarded to the DD/P Regulations Staff some 18 months ago, but apparently due to more urgent business had not been published. This Notice directs the DD/P Divisions and Senior Staffs to be accountable for logging and permits RID to dispense with logging of DD/P material other than their own.

2. The elimination of logging in RID should result in the release of four people for more necessary work, and I felt that for this reason the issue should be pursued further and with some vigor. Consequently, I talked to [] this morning and he agreed to publish the Notice within the next two to three weeks.

3. In addition to dispensing with logging in RID, the Notice also provides for the use of a courier receipt and document receipt form number 240d. [] of Forms Management informed me that he worked on Form 240d in December of 1961 [] Twenty sets of forms were made up for coordination purposes. After a definite decision is made to use the form on a full-scale basis, it will take three to four months to have a supply printed up through commercial sources.

4. It is my understanding from [] who is responsible for the draft of the Notice had staffed it out previously with the Office of Security.



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CORRESPONDENCE STYLE AND PROCEDURES

" nor does it (the manual) concern the flow and control of mail within the Agency."

120. g. page 66

"All envelopes or packages containing material classified CONFIDENTIAL and above, are customarily (underlining provided), accounted for by Courier's Classified Mail Receipts (Forms 35-16 and 35-16a or 240 and 240a) "

120. h. page 67

"A Document Receipt, (Form 38-16 or 243) is required for all correspondence classified SECRET transmitted outside CIA. Its use is optional for SECRET correspondence transmitted within the Agency and CONFIDENTIAL material forwarded outside CIA. "

120. d. page 63

"File and Routing Slip, Form No. 35-1 (redesignated Form No. 238) - This six-part form is designed to provide intra-office (underlining supplied) mail control when the volume of correspondence justifies using control measures. Generally, other transmittal or routing slips are unnecessary when this form is used. "

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 - Transmission of Classified Documents
to Outside CIA

TOP SECRET - Not registered --- Receipts will always be obtained.

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL - Not registered --- Document receipts for
SECRET but not for
CONFIDENTIAL.

A Registered Document may not be transferred from one area custodian to
another or to an activity outside CIA, except through the CIA Custodian of
Registered Documents.

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 - Transmission of Classified Documents
Within CIA

TOP SECRET - Receipts in all cases. The recipient's signature in the
sender's TS Log Book may be substituted for the standard document receipt
form.

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 continued WITHIN CIA

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Documents, not registered will be enclosed
in chain envelopes and sealed by means of a CIA gummed label, only when
delivery is made by couriers or messengers.

Document Receipts will be obtained only when the sender considers it desirable*
Signature in sender's Log Book may be substituted.

Messengers shall be permitted to deliver such documents only within CIA buildings.

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 - MAINTENANCE OF LOGS

TOP SECRET LOGS

Alternate or Assistant TS Control Officers shall be responsible for the maintenance
of TS logs. The Logs will list all TS material.

*Underscoring added.

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SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL LOGS

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Logs will be maintained by responsible persons designated specifically for that purpose by Operating Officials.

All SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material, not registered, will be logged in at the initial point of receipt in an office, normally at the division level (except in the smaller divisions), and will be logged out at the final point of dispatch when bound for destinations outside of the office or division level, when dispatched to a field office or between subdivisions of an office located in different buildings.

Organizational units not included in the foregoing may maintain logs when deemed desirable for operational reasons or because of the nature of the activity involved.

Logs will be maintained on approved forms. approved by the Chief, Management Staff or on other recording media approved jointly by the CIA Records Officer and the Director of Security.

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14 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cost of Forms Used in Mail Control

25X1 [redacted] of the Office of the Records Administration Officer informed me today that the figure of \$960,000 per annum for "mail and correspondence control and logging forms" was estimated as follows:

- a. Cost of printing average form = \$600 per form, 80 forms
- b. Eighty forms at \$600 each = \$48,000
- c. Estimated minimum cost to use a printed form = \$20
Total annual cost of forms \$20 x \$48,000 = \$960,000
- d. Estimated saving by eliminating 50% of the forms = \$480,000

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[redacted]
Office of the Deputy Director
(Support)

✓ Orig DD/S Subject
1 DD/S Chrono

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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FOLLOW-UP

1. Clarification
 - a. Logging security requirements
 - b. Use of courier receipts
 - c. Use of document receipts
2. Unification of systems administratively vs. better integration and cooperation in use of couriers.
 - a. Office of Security's view
 - b. DD/P-CI's view
 - c. Systems affected
3. Handbook after (1)
 - a. Responsibility for preparation
4. Elimination of logging in RID
 - a. Before new if delayed or
 - b. Improvement in procedures in the meantime
5. OSA's Courier schedule particularly airline tickets purchases, which might be taken over by Central Processing Branch
6. Forms--?
7. Items mentioned in memo to Exec. Asst. which are being looked into by M&C Br. and others.

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